Abstract-The idea that compressed sensing may be used to encrypt information from unauthorized receivers has already been envisioned, but never explored in depth since its security may seem compromised by the linearity of its encoding process.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rise of paradigms such as wireless sensor networks [1] where a large amount of data is locally acquired by sensor nodes and transmitted to other nodes for further processing, defending the privacy of digital data gathered and distributed by the network is a relevant issue. Normally, this privacy requirement is met by means of encryption stages securing the transmission channel [2] , implemented in the digital domain and following the analogto-digital conversion of the signal. Due to their complexity, these cryptographic modules (e.g., those implementing AES [3] ) may require considerable resources, especially in terms of power consumption.
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F. Pareschi and G. Setti are with the Engineering Department in Ferrara (ENDIF), University of Ferrara, Italy (e-mail: fabio.pareschi@unife.it, gianluca.setti@unife.it). acquisition schemes. CS exploits the structure of certain signal classes to simultaneously perform data compression and acquisition, possibly at the physical interface between the analog and digital domain and thus allowing acquisition at subNyquist rates [6] - [8] . Within this framework, many sensing architectures have been proposed for a variety of signal classes [9] - [11] .
Improving on preliminary studies [12] - [15] and applications [16] we investigate the possibility of using CS as a physicallayer method to embed security properties in the acquisition process. Although it is well known that CS cannot be regarded as a perfectly secure encoding method, we will formalize its main weaknesses and strengths, thus allowing an exploration of the trade-off between security properties and resource requirements in low-complexity systems for which an almostzero cost encryption mechanism is an attractive option.
In more detail, the encryption strategy we devise here relies on the fact that any user decoding the CS measurements must be completely aware of the encoding matrix used in the acquisition process in order to achieve exact reconstruction. In defect of this information, the recovered signal will be subject to a significant amount of reconstruction noise lowering its quality. We exploit this decoder-side sensitivity to provide multiple levels of encryption: when it is completely unknown the signal cannot be recovered, whereas if the matrix is known up to a certain controlled but undetectable perturbation (as simple as flipping the sign of a small subset of the original entries) the signal can be recovered with limited quality.
Hence, encoding matrices and their perturbations are obtained from private keys: high-class receivers are given a complete key and know the true encoding matrix, lower-class receivers are given an incomplete key resulting in a partially corrupted encoding matrix.
While the effect of generic perturbations and basis mismatches on the performance of CS decoding has been studied in detail [17] - [19] the idea of exploiting sparse, undetectable perturbation matrices to distinguish multiple user classes with different decoding performances is new to the best of our knowledge.
This contribution is structured as follows: in Section II we briefly review the theoretical framework of CS, introduce the mathematical model of two-class and multiclass CS, and give a lower bound on the reconstruction error norm suffered by lower-class receivers depending on the chosen amount of perturbation.
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Section III addresses the robustness of standard and multiclass CS w.r.t. straightforward statistical attacks. While CS is not perfectly secret in the Shannon sense [13] and, in general, suffers from the continuity due to its linear nature, we show that the distribution of most CS-encoded random measurements is asymptotically independent of the input signal and that the convergence to this behavior is sharp w.r.t. the signal size. Hence, eavesdroppers are practically unable to extract but a very limited amount of information from the sole statistical analysis of CS measurements.
In Section IV we propose example applications of multiclass CS to concealing sensitive information in images, electrocardiographic tracks and speech signals. The reconstruction performances are evaluated in detail to prove the efficacy of this strategy at embedding security features in CS, with the additional degree of freedom of allowing multiple quality levels and eventually hiding selected signal features to certain user classes.
II. MULTICLASS COMPRESSED SENSING

A. Preliminaries
Compressed sensing [4] , [5] originates from considering the following setting: let x be a signal in R n and y a vector of m entries that we will call measurements, obtained from x by applying a linear transformation y = Ax or equivalently
with A m×n the encoding matrix. Under suitable assumptions, it is possible to recover x from y even if m < n and thus A is a non-invertible operator. The first assumption is a prior on x, i.e., we assume that it is k-sparse w.r.t. a sparsity basis D n×n or, more generally, a dictionary D n×p with p ≥ n, i.e., for each instance of x there is a vector s ∈ R p such that x = Ds and the number of non-zero elements in s is the so-called 0-norm, s 0 = k, with k n ≤ p. Asserting that a signal is represented by k < m < n non-zero coefficients in a certain domain intuitively means that its intrinsic information content is smaller than the apparent dimensionality.
A second assumption must be made on the structure of the encoding matrix. More than one condition has been formulated in literature, all of them aiming at guaranteeing that the nonzero entries of s, after mapping through D, will not end up in the kernel of A. To the end of this paper, it suffices to say that the most universal option is choosing A as a typical instance of a random matrix with i.i.d. entries from a subgaussian distribution, e.g., Gaussian or Bernoulli [20] .
When these conditions hold, the solution to the underdetermined system y = ADs is the sparsest vector
Moreover, if the dimensionality of the measurements m ≥ Ck log n k (with C > 0 a universal constant) is not too small w.r.t. the original signal space and the sparsity being considered, then the previous minimization can be relaxed to the convex optimization problem
still yielding the exact solution: (P 1 ) is a linear programming (LP) problem and can be solved with polynomial-time algorithms [21] . In the following, we will indicate this problem and its generic solver as the min 1 decoder. Furthermore, we will often consider the normalized measurements y j = yj / √ n instead of y j : this scaling is not only theoretically needed to study the asymptotic properties of CS acquisition schemes in non-diverging conditions, but is also practically required in the design of acquisition front-ends since the measurements must be digitized in a finite range which would otherwise increase with the signal dimensionality.
B. Multiclass Encryption by Compressed Sensing
From a cryptographic perspective, CS may be interpreted as a private key cryptosystem where the input signal x is the plaintext, the measurement vector y is the ciphertext and the encryption algorithm is a linear transformation operated by the encoding matrix A defining the acquisition process.
In the classic setting, Alice acquires a plaintext x by CS using the encoding matrix A and sends to Bob the ciphertext y; Bob is able to successfully recover x from y if he is provided with A or equivalently the private key required to generate it.
Since most of the implementations of CS acquisition systems [9] , [10] entail the use of i.i.d. Bernoulli random matrices generated by a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) we define encryption key (or shared secret) the initial seed which is expanded by the PRNG to generate a sequence of encoding matrices. In the following we will assume that the period of this sequence is sufficiently long to guarantee that in a reasonable observation time no two encoding matrices will be the same, i.e., that each plaintext will be encoded with a different matrix. With this hypothesis, we let each encoding matrix A be a generic, unique element of the aforementioned sequence.
Let us consider a scenario where multiple users receive the same measurements y with a distinction: some of them know the encoding matrix A, whereas the others only know an approximate version of it. The resulting mismatch between A and its approximation used in the decoding process by the latter set of receivers will limit the quality of signal recovery as detailed in the following.
1) Two-class scheme: With this principle in mind a straightforward, undetectable method to introduce controlled perturbations is flipping the sign of a subset of the entries of the encoding matrix in a random pattern. More formally, let A (0) denote an initial encoding matrix and C (0) a subset of c < m·n entries chosen at random for each A (0) . We construct the encoding matrix A (1) with
and use it to encode x. Although this alteration simply involves inverting c randomly chosen sign bits in a buffer of m · n pseudorandom symbols, we will use its linear model
where ∆A is a c-sparse perturbation matrix of entries
and density η = c /mn, i.e., the ratio of non-zero entries w.r.t. the product of the dimensions of ∆A.
A first-class user receiving y = A (1) x and knowing the true encoding A
(1) is able to recover, in absence of other noise sources and with m sufficiently larger than k, the exact sparse solution s via min 1 decoding. A second-class user only knowing y and A (0) is instead subject to an equivalent nonwhite noise term ε due to missing pieces of information on
where ε = ∆Ax is a pure disturbance since both ∆A and x are unknown to the second-class decoder.
Although an upper bound on the reconstruction error norm x − x 2 2 (with x the original signal andx its reconstruction) is known for measurements affected by additive noise [22, Theorem 1] , the availability of a corrupted encoding matrix will unavoidably lead to a corrupted reconstruction. To guarantee this difference between first and second-class receivers, in Section II-C we will provide a lower bound on the reconstruction error norm for second-class users depending on the perturbation density η.
2) Multiclass scheme: The two-class division strategy may be iterated to devise an arbitrary number w of user classes: sign-flipping can be applied on disjoint entry subsets
If the signal x is encoded with A (w−1) then we may distinguish high-class users knowing the complete encoding A (w−1) , low-class users knowing only A (0) and mid-class users knowing A (u+1) with u = 0, . . . , w − 3. This simple technique can be applied to provide multiple access modes with different reconstruction performances at the decoder.
3) A System Perspective: The strategy described in this section provides a multiclass encryption architecture where the shared secret between the CS encoder and each receiver is distributed depending on the quality level granted to the latter.
In particular, the full encryption key of a w-class CS system is composed of w seeds, i.e., low-class users are provided the secret Key(A (0) ), class-1 users are provided Key(A (1) ) = Key(C (0) ), Key(A (0) ) up to high-class users with Key(
A sample scenario is depicted in Fig. 1 .
From the resources point of view, multiclass CS can be enabled with very small computational overhead. The encoding Fig. 1 . A multiclass CS network: the encoder acquires x(t) at sub-Nyquist rate and transmits the measurement vector y. Low-quality decoders reconstruct the signal with partial knowledge of the encoding, resulting in additive noise ε (u) and leading to an approximate solutionŝ (u) for the u-th user class. matrix generator is the same at both the encoder and highclass decoder side, whereas lower-class decoders may reuse the same generation scheme but are unable to rebuild the true encoding due to the missing pieces of information on the full encryption key.
The initial matrix A (0) is updated from a pseudorandom binary stream generated by a PRNG, and the introduction of sign-flipping patterns is a simple post-processing step that can be carried out by reusing the same PRNG on the stream buffer with minimal computational cost.
Since the values generated by this PRNG are never exposed cryptographically secure generators may be avoided, provided that the period with which the matrices are reused is kept extremely large -this requirement is crucial to avoid certain attacks detailed in the companion paper.
C. Lower-Class Reconstruction Error Bound
In order to quantify the reconstruction performance gap between low and high-class users receiving the same CS measurements from the network of Fig. 1 , we now provide a lower bound on the reconstruction error for the two-class case starting from the basic intuition that if the sparsity basis of x is not the identity, then most plaintexts x / ∈ Ker (∆A), so the additive noise ε = ∆Ax = 0.
Assume that A (0) is an m×n i.i.d. Bernoulli random matrix. This implies that A (1) in (2) is statistically indistinguishable from A (0) since all points in the matrix space {−1, 1} m×n have the same probability. Any exact reconstruction condition on A (0) therefore holds for A (1) , e.g. the restricted isometry property (RIP) w.r.t. k-sparse signals [23] or the DonohoTanner phase transition [24] . The consequence of these properties is that in order to perform exact signal recovery, the dimensionality m of the measurement vector y must exceed the sparsity k by a quantity depending on the rate k /n. We will consider m /n and k /n so that a first-class decoder knowing A (1) is able to perfectly reconstruct the original signal.
The following result on the second-class decoder error is therefore solely due to the mismatch between the true encoding A
(1) and its partially corrupted version A (0) . Theorem 1 (Second-class reconstruction error bound). Let:
n be a random vector having a k-sparse representation s w.r.t. a sparsity basis or dictionary D, and define
be as in (2) with ∆A the sparse random perturbation matrix in (3) of density η ≤ 1 2 ; 3) y ∈ R m be the random measurements y = A (1) x so that (P 1 ) constrained by y = A (1) x yields the exact solution s.
Then for all θ ∈ (0, 1) any reconstructionx satisfying y = A (0)x has the following properties:
i) with probability exceeding the value
the reconstruction error norm
where σ max (·) denotes the maximum singular value of its argument. ii) if x is sampled from an α-mixing random process [25, Section 27] such that lim n→∞ 1 n E x > 0, then for n → ∞ and k /n → r, m /n → q ≥ −Cr log r (for some universal constant C [20] ) the reconstruction error norm
with probability 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. Simply put, when A (0) is i.i.d. Bernoulli the density η of the sparse perturbation matrix ∆A controls the reconstruction error norm at second-class decoders in a predictable fashion, consequently reducing the reconstruction signal-to-noise ratio and allowing lower-class decoders with sub-optimal reconstruction performances.
In particular, the non-asymptotic case in (6) is a probabilistic lower bound on the reconstruction error norm affecting the second-class decoder: as an example, by assuming ζ = 0.99, Fx /E 2 x = 1.0001, n = 1024, m = 512 and taking θ = 0.05 ⇒ η = 0.267 to straightforwardly obtain an upper bound on the reconstruction SNR Ex / x−x 2 2 from (6) of 20.38 dB. This value is a best-case situation for the second-class decoder, which will exhibit significantly higher amounts of reconstruction error for most instances of this signal recovery problem as will be shown in the examples of Section IV. A stronger asymptotic result is then obtained in (7) when the acquired signal is sampled from an α-mixing random process. The profile of the resulting asymptotic upper bound on the reconstruction SNR is depicted in Fig. 2 for different undersampling rates q = m /n.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF COMPRESSED SENSING
Consider a generic CS scheme as in Section II-A with y = Ax and A an m × n i.i.d. Bernoulli random matrix performing a linear encoding of the plaintext x ∈ R n into the ciphertext y ∈ R m . The vectors x, y are considered random with a priori distributions f X (x), f Y (y) as in the classic Shannon framework [26] . In this setting we highlight some security properties and limits of CS.
A. Security Limits
The encoding performed by CS is a linear mapping, and as such it cannot completely hide the information contained in x. This has two main consequences: first, linearity propagates scaling. Hence, it is simple to distinguish x from x if one knows that x = αx for some scalar α. For the particular choice α = 0 this leads to a known argument [13, Lemma 1] against the fundamental requirement for perfect secrecy that the conditional PDF f Y |X (y, x) = f Y (y). In the following, we will prove that a scaling factor is actually all that can be inferred from the statistical analysis of CS-encoded ciphertexts.
Second, linearity implies continuity. Hence, whenever x and x are close to each other for a fixed A, the corresponding y and y will also be close to each other. This fact goes against the analog version of the diffusion (or avalanche effect) requirement for digital-to-digital ciphers [27] .
If the encoding process did not entail a dimensionality reduction, this fact could be straightforwardly exploited every time a x , y pair is known. If a new ciphertext y is available that is close to y , then it is immediately known that the corresponding plaintext x must be close to x thus yielding a good starting point for, e.g., a brute-force attack.
The fact that m < n slightly complicates this setting since the counterimages of y through A belong to a whole subspace in which points arbitrarily far from x exist in principle. Yet, encoding matrices A are chosen by design so that the probability of their null space aligning with x and x (that are k-sparse w.r.t. a certain D) is overwhelmingly small [23] . Hence, even if with some relaxation from the quantitative point of view, neighboring ciphertexts strongly hint at neighboring plaintexts.
As an objection to this seemingly unavoidable issue note that the previous argument only holds when the encoding matrix remains the same for both plaintexts, while by our assumption on the very large period of the generated sequence of encoding matrices two neighboring plaintexts x , x will most likely be mapped by different encoding matrices to nonneighboring ciphertexts y , y .
B. Achievable Security Properties
While perfect secrecy is unachievable, we may introduce the notion of asymptotic spherical secrecy and show that CS with universal encoding matrices has this property, i.e., no information can be inferred on the plaintext x from the statistical properties of the random measurements y but its power. The implication of this property is the basic guarantee that a malicious eavesdropper intercepting the measurement vector y will not be able to extract any information on the plaintext except for its energy.
of plaintexts of increasing length n, and {y (n) } n∈N be the corresponding sequence of ciphertexts. Assume that the power of the plaintext is positive and finite, i.e.,
where → D denotes convergence in distribution as n → ∞.
From an eavesdropper's point of view and for finite n, spherical secrecy means that given any ciphertext y we have
implying that any two different plaintexts with an identical, prior and equal energy e x = x 2 2 = W x n remain approximately indistinguishable from the ciphertexts. In the asymptotic setting, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 (Asymptotic spherical secrecy of CS encoding).
Let:
1) x (n) = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∈ R n be a bounded-value plaintext with power 0 < W x < +∞; 2) y j = 1 √ n n−1 k=0 A j,k x k be any entry in the corresponding ciphertext y (n) obtained by means of an i.i.d. subgaussian random matrix A. For n → ∞ we have
The proof of this statement is given in Appendix B. Since the rows of A are independent, the measurements are also independent and Proposition 1 asserts that, although not secure Outcome of second-level statistical tests to distinguish between two orthogonal plaintexts. In (a) the two plaintexts have the same energy, spherical secrecy applies and the uniform distribution of p-values shows that the corresponding ciphertexts are statistically indistinguishable. In (b) the two plaintexts have different energies, spherical secrecy does not apply and the distribution of p-values shows that the corresponding ciphertexts are distinguishable.
in the Shannon sense, CS is able to conceal the plaintext up to the point of being asymptotically spherical-secret as in (8) .
As a more empirical demonstration of spherical secrecy for finite-n, we consider an attack aiming at distinguishing two orthogonal plaintexts x and x from their encryption. The attacker has access to a large number C of ciphertexts collected in a set Y obtained by applying different, randomly chosen encoding matrices to a certain x as in (1) . Then, the attacker collects another set Y of C ciphertexts, all of them corresponding either to x or to x , and must tell which is the true plaintext between the two. This reduces the attack to an exercise of statistical hypothesis testing, the null assumption being that the distribution underlying the samples in Y is the same as that underlying the samples in Y . For maximum reliability, we address this exercise with a two-level testing approach, i.e. we repeat the above experiment many times, for randomly chosen orthogonal x and x , each time performing a two-way KolmogorovSmirnov (KS) test matching the empirical distributions of Y and Y . Each of these tests yields a p-value quantifying the probability that two data sets coming from the same distribution exhibit larger differences w.r.t. those at hand. Given their meaning, individual p-values could be compared against a desired significance level to give a first assessment whether the null hypothesis (i.e., equality in distribution) can be rejected.
Yet, since it is known that p-values of independent tests on distributions for which the null assumption is true must be uniformly distributed in [0, 1] we collect P of them and feed this second-level set of samples into a one-way KS test to assess uniformity at the standard significance level 5%.
This testing procedure is done for n = 256 in the cases e x = e x = 1 (same energy plaintexts) and e x = 1, e x = 1.01, i.e., with a 1% difference in energy between the two plaintexts. The resulting p-values for P = 5000 are computed by matching pairs of sets containing C = 5 · 10 5 ciphertexts, yielding the p-value histograms depicted in Figure 3 . We report the histograms of the p-values in the two cases along with the p-value of the second-level assessment, i.e., the probability that samples from a uniform distribution exhibit a deviation from a flat histogram larger than the observed one. When the two plaintexts have the same energy, all evidence concurs to say that the ciphertext distributions are statistically indistinguishable. In the second case, even a small difference in energy causes statistically detectable deviations and leads to a correct inference of the true plaintext between the two. Hence, asymptotic spherical secrecy has finite-n effects (for additional evidence obtained by numerical computation of the Kullback-Leibler Divergence see [12] ). From a more formal point of view, we may evaluate the convergence rate of (9) for finite n to obtain some further guarantee that an eavesdropper intercepting the measurements will observe samples of an approximately Gaussian random vector bearing very little information in addition to the energy of the plaintext.
We hereby consider a plaintext x ∈ R n as a random vector whose instances have energy 0 < e x < +∞ so that they lie on the sphere S n−1 ex of R n with radius √ e x .
The most general convergence rate for sums of i.i.d. RVs is given by the Berry-Esseen Theorem [28] as O n . In our case, we simply apply a remarkable result of [29] that improves the Berry-Esseen convergence rate to certain linear combinations of i.i.d. RVs.
Proposition 2 (Rate of convergence in distribution of CS measurements). Consider a random vector x ∈ R
n with finite energy e x and let A j,k in (1) be zero mean, unit variance, finite fourth moment RVs.
For any ρ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a subset F ⊆ S n−1 ex with probability measure
Proposition 2 with ρ sufficiently small means that it is most likely (actually, with probability exceeding 1 − ρ) to observe an O(n −1 ) convergence between f Y j |X and the limiting distribution N (0, W x ).
The function C(ρ) is loosely bounded in [29] , so to complete this analysis we performed a thorough Montecarlo evaluation of its possible values. In particular, we have taken thus yielding 50 megasamples of y j for each x and n. On this large sample set we are able to accurately estimate the previous PDF on 4096 equiprobable intervals, and compare it to the same binning of the normal distribution as in the LHS of (10) for each (x, n). This method yields sample values for (10) , allowing an empirical evaluation of the quantity C(ρ).
In this example, when ρ ≥ 10 −3 Proposition 2 holds with C(ρ) = 1.34 · 10 −2 . Hence, straightforward statistical attacks on a CS-encoded ciphertext may extract only limited information about the plaintext. Yet, other attacks may rely on a larger amount of information, the next level of threat being known-plaintext attacks [27] . These attacks are based on the availability of some plaintext-ciphertext pairs and aim at the extraction of information on the encoding process that can be reused to decode future ciphertexts. Due to its criticality and theoretical depth, the robustness of multiclass CS w.r.t. this class of attacks is tackled in the companion paper.
IV. APPLICATION EXAMPLES
In this section we detail some example applications for the multiclass CS strategy we propose. For each example, we highlight the reconstruction degradation affecting lowerclass users w.r.t. the corresponding high-class decoding performances in terms of reconstruction SNR, i.e., RSNR (dB) = 10 log 10
x−x 2 2 withx denoting the recovered approximation of the original sparse representation x; we will refer to the average RSNR, ARSNR (dB) = 10 log 10Ê . For each example, we will also report the upper bound on the RSNR straightforwardly obtained from (7) .
Our emphasis is on showing that, despite its simplicity, our method is effective in making information unrecoverable for lower-class receivers at a negligible cost. To do so, reconstructed signals are not only characterized by their ARSNR (that, in any case, suffers a noteworthy degradation) but are also processed by application-specific algorithms tuned to extract sensitive features that are equivalent to partially informed attacks attempting to break the devised encryption mechanism. More specifically, we will try to recover an English sentence from a speech segment, the location of the PQRST peaks in an electrocardiographic (ECG) signal, and printed text in an image. The simulation framework reproducing these tests is available at http://securecs.googlecode.com.
A. Speech Signals
We consider a subset of spoken English sentences from the PTDB-TUG database [30] with original sampling frequency f s = 48 kHz, variable duration and sentence length. Each speech signal is divided in segments of n = 512 samples and encoded by two-class CS with m = n /2 measurements (q = 1 /2). We obtain the sparsity basis D by applying principal component analysis [31] to 500 n-dimensional segments yielding an orthonormal basis.
The encoding matrix A (1) is generated from an i.i.d. Bernoulli random matrix A (0) by adding to it a sparse random perturbation ∆A chosen as in (3) with density η. The encoding in (4) is simulated in a realistic setting, where each window x of n samples is acquired with a different instance of A (1) yielding m measurements per speech segment. As for the decoding stage, we apply the SPGL 1 solver [32] , [33] to solve (P 1 ) given A (1) (first-class) and A (0) (second-class). For a given encoding matrix a first-class receiver is capable of decoding a clean speech signal with ARSNR = 32 dB, whereas a second-class receiver is subject to significant RSNR degradation when η increases, as shown in Fig. 5a . Note that while the RSNR for η = 0 has a relative deviation of 4 dB around its mean, as η increases the observed RSNR deviation is less than 0.5 dB.
To further quantify the quality of lower-class decoding, we process the reconstructed signal with the Google Web Speech API [34] , [35] which provides basic Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR). The ratio of words correctly inferred by ASR for different values of η is reported in Fig. 5b . This figure also reports a typical decoding case: a first-class user (i.e., η = 0) recovers the signal with RSNR = 24.8 dB, whereas a second-class decoder only achieves a RSNR = 6.8 dB when η = 0.03. The corresponding ratio of recognized words is 14 /14 against 8 /14. In both cases the sentence is intelligible to a human listener, but the second-class decoder recovers a signal that is sufficiently corrupted to cripple straightforward ASR.
B. Electrocardiographic Signals
We extend the example in [12] by processing a large subset of ECG signals from the MIT PhysioNet database [36] sampled at f s = 250 Hz. In particular, we report the case of a typical 25 minutes ECG track (sequence e0108) and encode windows of n = 250 samples by two-class CS with m = 90 measurements, amounting to a dataset of 1500 ECG instances. The encoding and decoding stages are identical to those in Section IV-A and we assume that the sparsity basis is a discrete Gabor time-frequency dictionary [37] of p = 1440 atoms.
In this setting, the first-class decoder is able to reconstruct the original signal with ARSNR = 23.7 dB, whereas a second-class decoder subject to a perturbation of density η = 0.03 achieves an ARSNR = 5.9 dB; the recovery degradation depends on η as reported in Fig. 6a .
As an additional quantification of the encryption at secondclass decoders we apply PUWave [38] , an Automatic Peak Detection algorithm (APD), to first and second-class signal reconstructions. In more detail, PUWave is used to detect the position of the P,Q,R,S and T peaks, i.e., the sequence of pulses whose positions and amplitudes summarize the diagnostic properties of an ECG.
The application of this APD yields the estimated peak instantst P,Q,R,S,T for each of J = 1500 reconstructed windows and each decoder class, which are afterwards compared to the corresponding peak instants as detected on the original signal prior to encoding. Thus, we define the average time dis- 2 and evaluate it for t R and t PQST . A first-class receiver is subject to a displacement σ tR = 0.9 ms rms of the R-peak and σ tPQST = 12.0 ms rms of the remaining peaks w.r.t. the original signal. On the other hand, a second-class user is able to determine the R-peak with σ tR = 2.8 ms rms while the displacement of the other peaks is σ tPQST = 83.5 ms rms -about 1 /10 of the period of a 1.2 Hz heartbeat. As η varies in [0, 0.05] this displacement increases as depicted in Fig. 6b , thus confirming that a second-class user will not be able to accurately determine the position and amplitude of the peaks with the exception of the R-peak.
C. Sensitive Text in Images
In this final example we consider an image dataset of people holding printed identification text and apply multiclass CS to selectively hide this sensitive content to lower-class users. The 640 × 512 pixel images are encoded by CS in 10 × 8 blocks each of 64 × 64 pixel while the two-class strategy is only applied to a relevant image area of 3 × 4 blocks. We adopt as sparsity basis the 2D Daubechies-4 wavelet basis [37] and encode each block of n = 4096 pixels with m = 2048 measurements; the encoding is generated with perturbation density η ∈ [0, 0.4].
The ARSNR performances of this example are reported in Fig. 7a as averaged on 20 instances per case, showing a rapid In order to assess the effect of our encryption method with an automatic information extraction algorithm, we have applied Tesseract [39] , an optical character recognition (OCR) algorithm, to the images reconstructed by a second-class user. The text portion in the reconstructed image data is preprocessed to enhance their quality prior to OCR: the images are first rotated, then we apply standard median filtering to reduce the highpass noise components. Finally, contrast adjustment and thresholding yield the two-level image which is processed by Tesseract.
To assess the attained OCR quality we have measured the average number of consecutive recognized characters (CRC) from the decoded text image. In Fig. 7b the average CRC is reported as a function of η: as the perturbation density increases the OCR fails to recognize an increasing number of ordered characters, i.e., a second-class user progressively fails to extract text content from the decoded image.
V. CONCLUSION
Although not perfectly secure, the extremely simple encoding process by linear random projection entailed by CS yields some encryption capabilities.
In particular, we have shown that the plaintext features leaking into the ciphertext and therefore retrievable by statistical analysis of the latter are limited to energy information. We have also shown that two plaintexts having the same energy and encoded with an i.i.d. Bernoulli random matrix generate statistically indistinguishable ciphertexts.
These observed properties are already embedded in CS acquisition schemes, thus providing a limited but zero-cost form of encryption which might be of interest in the design of resource-limited sensing systems.
Moreover, we leveraged the encoding performed by CS to envision a multiclass encryption scheme in which all receivers are given the same set of measurements, but are only enabled to reconstruct the original signal with a decoding quality depending on their class, i.e., on the private key they possess.
This additional design option comes at a very small cost since it simply amounts to the ability of flipping pseudo- randomly chosen elements of the encoding matrix, and thus represents an appealing alternative to balance the trade-off between the security of the encoded data and the resources required to provide it.
The capabilities of multiclass CS were exemplified by simulating the acquisition and data protection of sources such as speech segments, electrocardiographic signals and images containing sensitive text.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THE SECOND-CLASS RECONSTRUCTION ERROR LOWER BOUND
We first introduce two lemmas used in the proof of Theorem 1. In particular, the following lemma is crucial to finding the asymptotic result of (7). Lemma 1. Let x ∈ R n be a random vector sampled from an α-mixing random process with uniformly bounded fourth moments E[x 4 j ] ≤ X for some X > 0. Define
Proof of Lemma 1: Note first that from Jensen's inequality
and observe that
. From the α-mixing assumption we know that |X j,k | ≤ α(|j − k|) ≤ X and a sequence α(l) vanishing as l → ∞. Hence,
The thesis follows from the fact that the upper bound in (13) vanishes for n → ∞. This is obvious when
is divergent we may resort to the Stolz-Cesàro theorem to find lim n→∞
The following lemma is introduced to give a self-contained probabilistic result on the Euclidean norm of ε = ∆Ax in (4).
Lemma 2. Let:
1) ξ ∈ R n be a random vector with
; 2) ∆A be an m × n random perturbation matrix as in (3) with density η = 
with
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider 
For the aforementioned properties of ∆A we also have
otherwise that can be used in some cumbersome but straightforward calculations yielding
where
k . We are now in the position of using a one-sided version of Chebyshev's inequality for positive RVs 1 to say that, for any θ ∈ (0, 1),
which yields (15) by considering that when η ≤
Proof of Theorem 1: Indicate with s the exact reconstruction andŝ the approximate reconstruction obtained by the second-class decoder. Since all decoders receive the same measurements y = A
(1) x, we also have y = A (0)x . Since A (1) = A (0) + ∆A, if we define ∆x =x − x we may write
and thus A (0) ∆x = ∆Ax then ∆x 2 2 can be bounded as
With u = ∆Ax, by applying the method of Lagrange multipliers to the previous minimization problem we have that
where we used the Courant-Fischer minimax theorem [40] to highlight the dependence on the minimum eigenvalue of (A (0) A (0) t ) −1 that is λ min ((A . Hence,
By applying the probabilistic lower bound of Lemma 2 on ∆Ax 2 2 in (16), we have that ∆Ax 2 2 ≥ 4mη E x θ for θ ∈ (0, 1) and a given probability value exceeding ζ in (15) . Plugging the RHS of this inequality in (16) yields (6) .
As for the asymptotic case, note that q ≥ −Cr log r guarantees that m ≥ Ck log n k and thus that reconstruction is always feasible [21] .
Then, note also that A (0) is a generic i.i.d. random matrix with zero mean, unit variance entries: its asymptotic maximum singular value σ max (A (0) ) is known from [41] since almost surely all the singular values belong to [
By substituting the maximum singular value (17) in (16) 
We now apply Lemma 2 in ξ = x √ n with F ξ = 1 n 2 F x , E ξ = 1 n E x to the numerator of (18) . For m, n → ∞ and η ≤ 
Proof of Proposition 2:
We start by considering that for a given x each CS measurement y j (1) is a linear combination of n i.i.d. RVs A j,k with zero mean, unit variance and finite fourth moments. The coefficients of this linear combination are the components of the signal x, which by now we assume to have e x = 1, i.e., to lie on the unit sphere S 
with C(ρ) a positive, nonincreasing function. An application of this result to x on the sphere of radius √ e x , δ = 1 (A i.i.d.
Bernoulli) and the normalized measurements y j = yj √ n can be done by straightforward scaling of the standard normal PDF in (19) to N (0, ex n ), thus yielding the statement of Proposition 2.
